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Evidence Issues in Domestic Violence 
Civil Cases 
JANE H. AlKEN* and 
JANE C. MURPHY** 
I. Introduction 
New laws and policies aimed at protecting victims of domestic vi-
olence have been adopted across the country over the last twenty years. 
The legal approaches taken to protect battered women and control fam-
ily violence have resulted in significant changes in family law. l New 
laws include statutes permitting civil protection or restraining orders,2 
and laws requiring that domestic violence be considered in custody and! 
or visitation decisions.3 Both of these types of statutory reforms can 
* Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. 
** Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs, University of Baltimore 
School of Law. 
The authors wish to thank Washington University law students Rebecca Garcia, 
Vinceta Bathia, and Michelle Nasser for their excellent research assistance. Special 
thanks are also in order for Washington University colleagues, Professors Katherine 
Goldwasser and Richard Kuhns, and our friend and expert Dr. Mindy Mechanic. 
1. See generally Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox oj Hope: The Crime and Punishment 
oj Domestic Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1505 (1998); Developments in the 
Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1498, 1528-51 (1993). 
Changes in criminal laws including creating new criminal sanctions to fit the patterns 
of domestic violence and encouraging the enforcement of existing criminal sanctions 
in domestic situations have also developed in the last decade. See Bonnie J. Campbell, 
U.S. Department of Justice, A Message from Violence Against Women Office Director; 
Bonnie J. Campbell, 1 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT NEWS, July 1996 (last mod-
ified July 2, 1996), <http://www.usdoj.gov/vawo/newsletterlbjc796.htm>. 
2. All 50 states and the District of Columbia have some form of protection order 
statute. These statutes typically provide for eviction of the abuser from the home, 
temporary child custody, and a prohibition against continued abuse. Some state statutes 
provide for monetary relief for the duration of the order. The duration of the order 
varies with each state and ranges from 60 days to 3 years. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye 
E. Orloff, Providing Legal ProtectionJor Battered Women: An Analysis oJState Statutes 
and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 801 (1993) [hereinafter Klein & Orloff). 
3. See The Family Violence Project of the National Council of Juvenile and Family 
43 
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provide protection to adult victims of domestic violence and their chil-
dren. Evaluating a parent's fitness by considering past acts of violence 
to other family members results in decisions that are more likely to 
protect children than decisions that discount or disregard spousal 
abuse.4 Civil protection orders can provide abused women and their 
children with a quick and easily accessible remedy that provides hous-
ing, financial relief, and an order for custody.s While there is some 
controversy about the effectiveness of such orders in cases involving 
severe violence,6 most advocates and scholars agree that these statutes 
can make some improvement in the lives of women and children.7 
The effectiveness of these new laws in reducing the incidence of 
domestic violence, however, has been limited for a number of reasons.8 
One of the major barriers to using these laws to protect women is that 
proving domestic violence in court is difficult. First, the victim is often 
the only witness to the abuse. For a variety of reasons, victims are 
reluctant to testify against their abusers and pursue civil and criminal 
remedies.9 Even when they do testify, women who experience domestic 
violence are often not believed. Despite changes in legal and popular 
conceptions of domestic violence, judges 10 and juries 11 continue to ig-
nore or discount victims' testimony about the abuse. 
Court Judges, Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes 
and Legal Practice, 29 FAM. L.Q. 197 (1995) [hereinafter the Family Violence Project]. 
4. Id. 
5. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 2, at 812. 
6. See, e.g., Eva S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Introduction, to Do ARRESTS AND 
RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 1, 1-5 (1996). 
7. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 210-12 (1979); MollyChau-
dhiri & Kathleen Daly, Do Restraining Orders Help? Battered Women's Experience 
with Male Violence and Legal Process, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 227,245-47 (1992); 
Janice Grau et aI., Restraining Orders for Battered Women: Issues of Access and Ef-
ficacy, 4 WOMEN & POL. 13, 19-20 (1984) (concluding that protection orders are most 
effective in curtailing abuse when the level of violence is not severe); Lisa G. Lerman, 
A Model State Act: Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 61, 70 n.35 
(1984). 
8. Domestic violence is still a significant national problem. See generally U.S. 
DEP'T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A 
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY REpORT (1994). 
9. Sarah J. Lee, The Search for Truth: Admitting Evidence of Prior Abuse in Cases 
of Domestic Violence, 20 U. HAw. L. REv. 221, 252 (1998) [hereinafter The Search 
for Truth] (describing the unequal power and control in abusive relationships, which 
leads to victims recanting their allegations. This results in a "heightened" necessity 
for admitting evidence of prior abuse in domestic violence cases.); Lisa Marie De-
Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of 
Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 367--68 (1996) (finding that victims 
of domestic violence are uncooperative in apprc,lXimately 80 to 90% of criminal pros-
ecutions). 
10. JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM (1999). 
11. See, e.g., Comment, Prosecuting Domestic Crimes: Effectively Using Rule 
404(b) to Hold Batterers Accountablefor Repeated Abuse, 34 GONZ. L. REv. 361, 365 
(1998). 
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It is, therefore, essential for practitioners to be able to introduce as 
much evidence of the abuse as they can gather. Established principles 
of evidence law, however, present particular challenges in domestic 
violence litigation. While there is expansive literature on evidentiary 
challenges in criminal prosecutions for domestic violence, there is very 
little written about the way courts have looked at particular evidentiary 
issues in civil cases where domestic violence is at issue. This article is 
intended to assist practitioners in anticipating and responding to some 
of the evidentiary challenges in civil cases in which relief is sought for 
the victims of domestic violence. 
First, expert testimony is often necessary to dispel common myths 
about battered women and to educate judges and juries about the dy-
namics of domestic violence. Recent case law, however, has limited the 
admissibility of "non-scientific" expert testimony and may make it 
difficult for practitioners to use experts in their cases. In addition, par-
ticular evidentiary issues arise when victims are pursuing both criminal 
and civil remedies against the batterer. This article will explore the ways 
in which evidence issues may benefit and inhibit civil actions arising 
from the domestic violence. Finally, we will discuss the difficulties in 
using prior bad acts evidence. Because batterers tend to engage in re-
peated acts of abuse, evidence of prior acts may be particularly relevant 
in proving the extent of harm and predicting the likelihood of future 
abuse. Traditional principles of evidence law, however, often prohibit 
the admission of other crimes, wrongs and acts. 
II. The Use of Expert Opinion on the Effects 
of Battering 
When representing a domestic violence victim, the lawyer's vital but 
confounding task is to contextualize the abuse for the judge by eradi-
cating inevitable misconceptions and incomprehensible contradictions 
regarding the victim's perceptions and reactions. A battered woman's 
survival strategies appear maladaptive, illogical, and unstable. For ex-
ample, despite brutal abuse the woman stays in the relationship; she 
fails to protect her child from her abuser; her resulting alcohol or drug 
abuse may cause her to neglect her child; she may minimize or deny 
the abuse or she may appear erratic and unreliable because she contin-
ually relocates to avoid the abuser. 12 
12. See, e.g., Joan M. Schroeder, Using Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence in the 
Prosecution of the Batterer, 76 IOWA L. REv. 553 (1991); Audrey E. Stone & Karla 
M. Digirolama, Battered Women's Expert Testimony, Past and Present, 271 PLIJEST 
181 (1998). 
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Research reveals that a battered woman remains in her abusive re-
lationship because her abuser convinces her that she cannot survive 
outside the relationship. 13 She may rationalize that her child's need for 
a father outweighs the damage of his abuse. She may realistically fear 
that he will kill her if she escapes, or she may simply believe she cannot 
afford to support herself and her child without him. Expert opinion 
illuminates these paradoxes for the judge or jury. 14 
Three types of expert opinions facilitate an understanding of the 
dynamics and perspectives underlying a domestic violence relationship: 
(1) the clinically based opinion, (2) the social framework opinion, and 
(3) a hybrid of the clinically based and social framework opinions. The 
clinically based expert assesses the relationship and can offer opinion 
evidence about the particular effects of battering on this specific rela-
tionship. Social framework experts put clinical data in perspective, usu-
ally without any clinical relationship with the parties. The social frame-
work expert clarifies the contradictions and the misconceptions 
regarding domestic abuse. The hybrid expert offers a clinical opinion 
about the abuse and effects in this particular relationship and explains 
the behavior of the abused person. 
Too often lawyers offer clinically based testimony but overlook use-
ful social framework testimony. This reluctance may result from an 
erroneous belief that battered women's syndrome testimony remains 
the only admissible expert testimony in a domestic violence case.15 
Although evidence regarding battered women's syndrome establishes 
a self-defense claim to murder or assault, it remains inadequate when 
attempting to explain fundamental contradictions within an abusive re-
lationship.16 Lawyers' reluctance to offer expert opinion may result 
13. See, e.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 2000 WL 356315 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) 
(admitting testimony of domestic violence expert who described the characteristics of 
domestic violence and stated victims often remain in abusive relationship or remain 
silent about the abuse). 
14. Courts have noted the usefulness of expert opinion. For example, in Pratt v. 
Wood, 210 A.D.2d 741, 743 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), the court held that expert testimony 
in the field of domestic violence was generally admissible because the average person 
is uneducated on the psychological and behavioral characteristics typically shared by 
victims of abuse in a familial setting. 
15. See, e.g., People v. Gomez, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). In Gomez, 
the court found that the expert testimony explaining the victim's recantation had to be 
excluded and before such testimony could be credited, the prosecution had to prove 
that the victim suffered from battered women's syndrome. 
16. The battered women's syndrome has come under significant criticism in recent 
years. Many critics suggest that it perpetuates negative stereotypes about victims of 
violence and tends to pathologize their natural reactions to abuse. See, e.g., DONALD 
DOWNS, MORE THAN VICTIMS: BATIERED WOMEN, THE SYNDROME SOCIETY, AND 
THE LAW (1998); EDWARD GONDOLF & ELLEN FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SUR-
VIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS (1988); Pamela 
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from unfamiliarity with the extensive social science literature on abuse. 
Alternatively, lawyers may feel judges undervalue social-framework 
testimony because they view it as general information rather than spe-
cific application. While many academics have heralded the use of do-
mestic violence expert opinion in criminal cases, few have discussed 
its use in the civil arenaY 
Social framework opinion evidence often assists the fact finder in 
understanding the evidence or in determining a fact relevant to material 
issues. Therefore, it fits the requirements of Rule 702 or its common 
law equivalent. 18 Some judges might insist that the common experience 
of the fact finder encompasses this social framework information. On 
the contrary, most common experience regarding abuse remains a mis-
conception. 19 A few states directly address the need to admit expert 
opinion evidence to correct common misconceptions regarding abuse. 
For example, Ohio Rule 702 includes the language "A witness may 
testify as an expert if ... [t]he witness' testimony either relates to mat-
ters beyond the knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or 
dispels a misconception common among lay persons." (Emphasis 
added.)20 The Ohio legislature changed Rule 702 after the issue was 
raised about expert opinion regarding domestic violence.21 Still,judges 
may only reluctantly allow this testimony, insisting that such infor-
Posch, The Negative Effects of Expert Testimony on the Battered Women's Syndrome, 
6 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 485 (1998); Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered 
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1991). 
17. See, e.g., Paula Finley Mangum, Note, Reconceptualizing Battered Woman Syn-
drome Evidence: Prosecution Use of Expert Testimony on Battering, 19 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 593 (1999) (exploring and evaluating the use of expert testimony in the 
prosecution of a batterer); Cynthia Lynn Barnes, Supplement Annotation, Admissibility 
of Expert Testimony Concerning Domestic-Violence Syndromes to Assist Jury in Eval-
uating Victim's Testimony or Behavior, 57 A.L.R.5TH 315 (1998) (collecting and ana-
lyzing criminal cases in which the courts considered whether and when expert testi-
mony regarding domestic-violence syndromes may be used to assist the jury in 
evaluating a victim's testimony or conduct); Audrey E. Stone, Presenting Battered 
Women's Expert Testimony: Trial and Error, in HANDLING THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
CASE 1998, at 255 (PLI New York Practice Skills Course Handbook Series No. FO-
001 V, 1998) (discussing that prosecutors increasingly find it useful to use experts in 
domestic violence cases to explain the conduct of a victim, such as when a victim 
recants, changes her story, or continues to live with the perpetrator); Janet Parrish, 
Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in Criminal Cases, 11 
WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 75 (1996) (providing information and analysis about expert testi-
mony in cases involving battered women); Steven I. Platt, Women Accused of Homicide: 
The Use of Expert Testimony on Effect of Battering on Women-A Trial Judge's Per-
spective, 25 U. BALT. L. REv. 33 (1995) (recounting the pertinent facts and dispositions 
of sample cases in which the defense could be used). 
18. See, e.g., Pratt v. Wood, 210 A.D.2d 741, 743 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). 
19. Id. See also DONALD G. DUTTON WITH SUSAN K. GOLANT, THE BATTERER: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE (1995). 
20. Omo R. EVID. 702, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. (Banks-Baldwin 2000). 
21. State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Ohio 1990). 
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mation remains unnecessary or not "beyond his or her ken. ,,22 If the 
judge disallows an expert on this ground, the proponent should preserve 
the record for appeal by soliciting a summary of the expert's opinion. 
Of course, appeal in this area remains nearly fruitless because a trial 
court's admission or denial of expert testimony faces abuse of discre-
tion review.23 
Even with a judge inclined to admit expert opinion, additional hur-
dles exist. For example, judges suspect "experts" without requisite 
educational degrees. Rules regarding expert opinion specifically allow 
expertise based on experience. Nonetheless, some courts refuse to qual-
ify domestic violence workers as experts to testify regarding their 
knowledge of abuse arising from their experience working with women 
in shelters or other settings.24 Even when an expert possesses the req-
uisite educational degree, courts may reject the opinion as insufficiently 
"scientific." Courts may view domestic violence experts as "advo-
cates," lacking in "scientific distance.,,25 This view damages the ex-
pert's credibility, limits the effectiveness of the expert testimony, and 
may cause disqualification of the expert. 
Recent Supreme Court rulings on expert opinion may have had the 
effect of privileging scientific inquiry.26 This may increase the court's 
use of standard scientific requirements, like testability, peer review, 
publication, rate of error, and general acceptance.27 These scientific 
requirements often inappropriately assess the worth of social science 
studies or the clinical experience of the expert.2s In those states relying 
on the Frye standard, the court may find that such expert opinion is not 
22. See Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 V AND. L. REv. 414 (1952). 
23. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (holding that the 
question of admissibility of expert testimony is reviewable under "abuse of discretion" 
standard). 
24. See MARY ANN DUTTON, THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING 
BAlTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (Research Report, Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice and U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, National Institute of Mental Health, NCJ 160972). 
25. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329, 1336 (9th Cir. 1997) (dissenting judge 
calls into question the objectivity of the expert because she worked for a child advocacy 
center). 
26. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999) (holding 
that an inquiry into both relevance and reliability applies not only to "scientific" tes-
timony but to all expert testimony). 
27. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 (1993). 
28. But see generally David L. Faigman, The Syndromic Lawyer Syndrome: A Psy-
chological Theory of Evidentiary Munificence, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 817 (1996) (dis-
cussing a miscomprehension among lawyers about both the difficulty of doing social 
science research and the law's proper response when social science is difficult to con-
duct). 
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"generally accepted in the scientific community." 29 Some states spe-
cifically address this problem. For example, the California evidence 
code specifically exempts social framework evidence from the Frye 
test when offered to educate the fact finder about the common miscon-
ceptions regarding a victim's behavior?O 
In a case in which testimony included a tape recording of a violent 
incident in which the husband battered the wife with a camcorder after 
threatening to "smash [her] face in" in front of the children on Christ-
mas morning, a concurring Florida appellate judge voiced his discom-
fort regarding the reliability and competence of a court-appointed ex-
pert in the case: 
I am bound to say, however, that I am increasingly concerned about the 
proliferating and extensive use of psychologists in these family law cases 
and the extreme reliance trial courts appear to place on their opinions. 
These experts conduct interviews, sometimes do tests and then are al-
lowed to render opinions on an extraordinary range of subjects. They 
have been allowed to offer opinions on why a child nestles with its parent 
(no, it's not necessarily love), whether someone is prone to domestic 
violence, who is telling the truth, and who is "in denial." Yet, no one 
seems to be able to muster any measure of the competence or reliability 
of these opinions. On the one hand, it is certainly desirable to bring before 
the court as much evidence as possible to assist the trial court in making 
the best decision concerning the raising of the children in families tom 
by divorce. On the other hand, the rules of evidence exist for a reason, 
and the issue of competency of such broad reach of expert testimony is 
not something that should be taken lightly-particularly in such cases 
where there is frequently little other objective or disinterested evidence 
on which the court can rely? I 
Despite some courts' reluctance, social framework testimony re-
mains critical in domestic violence cases to explain victim behavior.32 
29. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye test still remains 
quite viable in many states. Essentially, in order for expert opinion to be admitted it 
must be scientific knowledge and method that is generally accepted among the relevant 
scientific authorities. This test places part of the decision about whether this evidence 
is "reliable" outside the court and within the purview of scientists. 
30. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West 1995) provides in pertinent part: 
(a) in a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible ... regarding battered 
women's syndrome, including the physical, emotional, or mental effects upon 
the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence ... 
(b) The foundation shall be sufficient for admission of this expert testimony if the 
proponent of the evidence establishes its relevancy and the proper qualifications 
of the expert witness. Expert opinion testimony on battered women's syndrome 
shall not be considered a new scientific technique whose reliability is unproven. 
31. Keesee v. Keesee, 675 So. 2d 655, 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Griffin, J. 
concurring). 
32. See generally Myrna Raeder, The Better Way; The Role of Batterers' Profiles 
and Expert "Social Framework" Background in Cases Implicating Domestic Violence, 
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The expert must educate the fact finder regarding the unfathomable 
dynamics underlying domestic violence relationships, and the subtle, 
confusing facts of abuse. 
The first question that occurs to people inexperienced with domestic 
violence is why a victim does not escape her abuser. This issue arises 
in requests for orders of protection (why now?), in custody determi-
nations (if he is so abusive, why did you stay and expose the children 
to this?), in requests for rehabilitative maintenance33 (why did you 
leave college while you were married and now want him to pay?), in 
tort actions (you consented to this treatment and cannot be heard to 
complain now), and in myriad other settings. Expert opinion explains 
why the victims minimize abuse and keep abuse a secret from friends, 
family, clergy, or physicians. 
Domestic violence experts facilitate custody determinations.34 It is 
often heard in the halls of family courts, "He beats his wife but he's 
a good father." Recent literature illuminates the fallacy of such a 
belief. Forty-five to 70 percent of battered women in shelters report 
that their batterers commit some form of child abuse.35 Even using 
the more conservative figure, child abuse is fifteen times more likely 
to occur in households in which there is domestic violence.36 More-
over, children simply witnessing domestic violence are more likely to 
grow up with serious maladaptive behavior patterns. Experts facilitate 
68 U. COLO. L. REv. 147 (1997) (proposing a reformulated model for the use of expert 
testimony in domestic violence related cases wherein prosecutors would be permitted 
to introduce domestic violence social science framework evidence that is not syndrome 
or profile oriented in order to level the evidentiary playing field and provide a back-
ground against which domestic violence evidence can be understood at trial). 
33. See, e.g., Garces v. Garces, 704 So. 2d 1106, 1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) 
(The wife's expert psychologist testified about the wife's psychological condition as a 
result of domestic abuse. The psychologist recommended that the wife consult with a 
psychiatrist at least once monthly and that the wife should attend individual therapy 
twice a week for at least a few years. The trial court included in the final judgment the 
following provision: "The husband shall be required to pay any presently outstanding 
and all reasonable future medical, psychological, psychiatric, counseling and medica-
tion expenses for care and treatment required by the wife as a result of his egregious 
conduct which are not covered by her medical insurance and for those items which are 
covered, the husband shall be responsible for any uncovered portions, including pay-
ment of any deductibles"). 
34. Sometimes the judge does not need an expert to see the risks posed by placing 
the child with a violent person. See, e.g., Berg v. Berg, 606 N.W.2d 895, 899 (N.D. 
2000) (Although the statute places a heavy burden of proof-clear and convincing 
evidence-upon the perpetrator of domestic violence to show unsupervised visitation 
will not harm the child, the statute imposes no burden on the custodial parent to prove, 
by expert testimony or otherwise, that unsupervised visitation with the more violent 
parent will in fact harm the child). 
35. The Link Between Child Abuse and Domestic Violence, CHILD PROTECfION 
LEADER (American Humane Association 1994). 
36. [d. 
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custody determinations by offering insight into the current and potential 
effects on children in a domestic violence household.37 
Presently, approximately 70 percent of contested custody cases that 
involve a history of domestic violence result in an award of sole or 
joint custody to the abuser.38 Such awards may result from the recent 
trend in which more and more states adopt "friendly parent" provisions 
as a factor in assessing which parent should receive custody of the 
children. A mother may find herself in a "Catch 22." If she fails to 
report the abuse, the court labels her an ineffective or neglectful mother 
failing to protect her child. If she reports the abuse, the court may label 
her an "unfriendly parent" with parental alienation syndrome, and she 
may lose custody of her child. This trend necessitates a critical distinc-
tion between an "unfriendly parent" and a mother attempting to protect 
herself and her child from the abuser, particularly when a victim min-
imizes her abuse or engages in maladaptive self-help behaviors?9 
Again, in such a situation, expert opinion critically educates the fact-
finder.4o 
Expert opinion may assist in sorting out particularly difficult deter-
minations. Of course, when parties make competing claims, either or 
both parties may use experts, and these experts may be court-appointed. 
For example, a Louisiana court faced a husband who physically abused 
his wife but not his minor child.41 The court admitted testimony of a 
court-appointed psychologist. The expert testified that the father re-
mained a stronger nurturer than the mother. The court ordered joint 
custody primarily because the mother prevented the father from seeing 
37. See, e.g., In re Lonell I., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding 
expert testimony is allowed but not required to prove effects of domestic violence on 
child's emotional and mental state); In re Marriage of Brainard, 523 N.W.2d 611 (Iowa 
Ct. App. 1994) (admitting expert testimony to detail the tragic and long-term conse-
quences of spousal abuse on children who witness the violence); In re Marriage of 
Houtchens, 760 P.2d 71 (Mont. 1988) (allowing expert in field of social work and 
domestic violence to testify that children are at risk living with men who batter, both 
because of the likelihood that the child will be battered and the likelihood that the child 
will rely on that person as a role model); Chafin v. Rude, 391 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1986) (allowing court appointed expert to testify that domestic violence jeopar-
dized the child's emotional development). 
38. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & THE COURTROOM: UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM, 
KNOWING THE VICTIM (American Iudges' Foundation). 
39. See Faries v. Faries, 607 So. 2d 1204, 1208 (Miss. 1992) (clinical social worker 
testified (1) that victim struggled with low self-esteem, (2) that her low coping skills 
indicated her husband emotionally abused her, and (3) that her condition would not 
prevent her from caring for the children). 
40. See, e.g., In the Matter of I.D. v. N.D, 652 N.Y.S.2d 468 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1996) 
(finding that the respondent was engaging in protective behavior in response to the 
petitioner's exercise of power and control over her). 
41. Windham v. Windham, 616 So. 2d 276, 297 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
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the child, and the joint custody provision of the Louisiana statute pro-
moted a frequent and continuing relationship with both parents. In con-
trast, a Mississippi court faced a father asserting that his wife was unfit 
to care for their children.42 The court admitted testimony of a clinical 
social worker. The expert testified that the mother struggled with low 
self-esteem, that her low coping skills indicated her husband emotion-
ally abused her, and that her condition would not prevent her from 
caring for her children. The court affirmed the award of custody to the 
father based on the chancellor's findings that the father had cared for 
the children while the mother was in school, that his possession of the 
house provided the children stability of a home environment in familiar 
surrounding, and that the mother had secreted the children for twenty-
three days. 
As useful as experts may be, they are often costly and impractical. 
The summary nature of order of protection hearings make calling an 
expert unlikely even if the party could find and afford one. If an expert 
is testifying in a civil action, costs can be substantially reduced through 
the introduction of "learned treatise" type evidence, relying on articles 
from reputable journals to assist in evaluating the social framework of 
the case.43 This can also be offered by providing the court and opposing 
party with a brief on the relevant issue in which expert writings are 
used to educate the court about the effect of the domestic violence on 
the woman and her children. 
III. Evidentiary Implications of Concurrent 
Civil and Criminal Proceedings 
Often an order of protection hearing occurs in the shadow of a crim-
inal prosecution for assault. This creates particular evidentiary issues 
that have both substantive and strategic implications. Police practices 
in anticipation of a criminal prosecution may be different. Police often 
play a more active role in gathering physical evidence and obtaining 
911 tapes and medical records of treatment following the incident. In-
stead of merely writing a brief report of a domestic dispute, many police 
forces are being trained to produce police reports that record "excited 
42. Faries v. Faries, 607 So. 2d 1204, 1210 (Miss. 1992). 
43. In order to qualify for the "learned treatise" exception to the hearsay rule, an 
expert must testify and affirm that the treatise is authoritative, or the party offering the 
treatise must prove its reliable authority by another expert or by judicial notice. This 
essentially allows the party to offer the information through an expert and minimize 
the costs of production of an expert or allows a party to cross examine that expert 
without having to hire a battling expert. See FED. R. EVID. § 803(18) (West 2000). 
HeinOnline -- 34 Fam. L.Q. 53 2000-2001
Evidence Issues in Domestic Violence Civil Cases 53 
utterances,,44 and other hearsay exceptions within the document.45 
Therefore, the police report can be used to conduct "victim-less pros-
ecutions" when the victim decides to withdraw the criminal complaint 
and does not wish to testify.46 These more detailed investigations and 
reports can be quite useful as supplemental and corroborating evidence 
of the domestic abuse in the protection order hearing and subsequent 
divorce and/or custody proceedings. The foundation requirements for 
the police record are for a public record.47 Many states allow such 
records to be authenticated by affidavit provided notice is given to the 
other party.48 Unlike a criminal case, the record can be used against the 
alleged perpetrator without the police officer present and subject to 
cross examination.49 Being able to use the police report without the 
officer present and testifying may be particularly important in an order 
of protection hearing when the cases tend to be heard on an expedited 
basis, the parties are often unrepresented, and the proceedings summary 
in nature. Any hearsay statements included in the report must also meet 
hearsay exceptions. "Excited utterances" may be the most likely hear-
say exception covering a victim or witness's statement if the report is 
taken at the scene and shortly after or during the violence incident.50 
44. An excited utterance is admissible if the statement relates to a startling event 
and is made while under the stress of that excitement. See FED. R. EVID. § 803(2). 
45. Many jurisdictions are using "victimless prosecution" strategies thus necessi-
tating creative application of the hearsay exceptions. Some states are even creating 
evidentiary rules that reduce the reliance on victims in these prosecutions. See CAL. 
EVID. CODE § 1370 (1997). This evidentiary rule allows the admission of hearsay 
statements in a domestic violence case if such a statement narrates, describes, or ex-
plains the infliction of threat of physical injury and the declarant is unavailable to 
testify. The statement must have been made within at least five years of the infliction 
of injury and must be written, electronically recorded, or provided to a law enforcement 
official. 
46. For an detailed and thoughtful discussion of "victimless prosecutions," see 
Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose, Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Vio-
lence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996). 
47. A public record generally requires either the testimony of a custodian of records, 
a document under seal, or, in some states, a "business record affidavit" establishing 
the authenticity of the document. The document must be produced by a public agency 
and generally includes reports setting forth the activities of the office or agency, matters 
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there is a duty to report 
(this likely covers the police report at the scene) or factual findings resulting from an 
investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law. See FED. R. EVID. §803(8). 
48. Missouri like many states allows the introduction of business records without 
the custodian provided the party offering the business record has an affidavit from the 
custodian of record swearing to the foundation and timely notice is given to the op-
posing party. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 490.680 (1999). 
49. Generally, police reports cannot be used against criminal defendants in criminal 
actions due to their confrontation clause implications. 
50. Actual physical violence is not required to prove that the event was "startling" 
for purposes of establishing an excited utterance. A threat should be enough. See Donna 
M. Matthews, Making the Connection: A Proposed Threat Hearsay Exception, 27 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 117, 138 (1997). 
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The timing can be significant. If the police arrived within thirty minutes 
of the assault, then her statements are likely to qualify. 51 Longer periods 
of time may make this a more difficult argument. Other hearsay ex-
ceptions that may cover victim or witness statements within the police 
document include present sense impressions (in some jurisdictions), 
state of mind exception provided her state of mind is an issue in the 
case,52 and statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment.53 
The hearing on the protection order is likely to occur prior to pros-
ecution and becomes a source for discovery and preservation of testi-
mony. This cuts both ways for the parties. The future prosecution may 
create an imbalance in the courtroom. In anticipation of the criminal 
prosecution, it is far more likely that the respondent has retained coun-
sel whereas the victim may still be without representation. An alleged 
perpetrator can use the hearing to preview the future criminal case. The 
testimony of the victim often provides a source of impeachment ma-
terial, particularly if she is unrepresented. This may become a time to 
vigorously cross-examine the victim and witnesses in the hopes of dis-
couraging them from going forward with the prosecution. Some crim-
inal attorneys have sought continuances in the order of protection hear-
ings citing the Fifth Amendment privilege of their clients not to be 
forced to testify. Although delays do not leave victims unprotected (the 
temporary stay away order is usually extended), the victim is denied 
other relief that may be necessary for her to sustain separation such as 
court-ordered mortgage payments by the perpetrator, child support, and 
protected visitation. In some cases, the law limits the number of con-
tinuances that can be granted and courts face the task of determining 
whether to deny the victim her relief or perhaps violate the Fifth 
Amendment right of the perpetrator. Some states have attempted to 
remedy this problem by preventing the use of the respondent's testi-
mony in any future proceeding and by ensuring that the finding of abuse 
51. See, e.g., Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1988); State v. Wood-
ward, 908 P.2d 231 (N.M. 1995); State v. Anderson 723 P.2d 464 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1986). 
52. The state of mind exception to the hearsay rule admits any statements by a 
declarant that concerns that declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion sensation, 
or physical condition. This includes statements of intent, plan, motive, design, mental 
feeling, pain, or bodily health but not statements of past condition. See, e.g., FED. R. 
EVID. § 803(3) (West 2000). 
53. Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment include statements 
describing present symptoms and past medical history as long as the statements are 
designed to elicit medical care. This certainly covers statements made to a treating 
physician that are pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. If the victim seeks care through 
the police officer taking the call, then her statements might qualify for an exception. 
However, if she merely is reporting the events and not seeking medical care then the 
statements will not qualify. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. § 803(4) (West 2000). 
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is not treated as res judicata (for future claims in which a finding of 
abuse could have an impact on the determination).54 
On the other hand, victims can enjoy certain benefits from the pro-
tection order hearing occurring before the prosecution. Future criminal 
defendants may also provide inculpatory testimony in this setting when 
testifying about the alleged abuse. The timing of the protection order 
hearing increases the likelihood that the lawyer for the defendant in the 
criminal case has not done sufficient investigation of the case, has had 
little time to understand the story from the alleged perpetrator's per - . 
spective, and is reasonably reluctant to allow the client to discuss the 
issue under oath. Such testimony may be admissible in the subsequent 
prosecution for both its impeachment and substantive value as party 
admissions. A represented victim may therefore be at a decided advan-
tage in settlement. In order to avoid a finding of abuse and to keep the 
defendant off the stand, a respondent may be willing to negotiate with 
his victim to create an order that may not otherwise be available after 
a hearing either because the statute does not provide for such relief or 
the judge is unwilling to order it after a hearing.55 These provisions 
include matters such as child support, maintenance, supervised visita-
tion, riddance of household guns, mandated drug drops as a condition 
of visitation, and repayment of the costs associated with the violence. 
IV. Introducing Evidence of Pattern of 
Abuse in Civil Cases 
The law of evidence in most states56 is governed by general princi-
ples favoring admissibility as long as the evidence is relevant57 and is 
not unduly prejudicial.58 Thus, most rules of evidence have developed 
as exclusionary rules-i.e., the evidence is presumed admissible unless 
some rule of evidence excludes it. Trial judges have wide discretion in 
54. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 455.060(3) (1999) (mandating that findings in an order 
of protection hearing are not res judicata). 
55. See A. HARRELL ET AL., COURT PROCESSING AND THE EFFECTS OF RESTRAIN-
ING ORDERS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS (Urban Institute 1993). 
56. In the majority of state courts, the "law of evidence" has been incorporated 
into a code of evidence. In many of these codes, the section numbers and content 
conform with the Federal Rules of Evidence. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. 
KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE 51.2 at 4 (1994). The references in the Article to 
Rule 404(b) evidence refers to evidence of other acts of abuse. About a dozen states 
have no comprehensive code of evidence but rather an amalgam of rules derived from 
case law, statutes, and constitutionally based rules. In these states case law has devel-
oped which defines the parameters of the exclusion of prior bad act evidence. Id. 
57. FED. R. EVID. § 401 & § 402. 
58. FED. R. EVID. § 403. 
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balancing the probative value of evidence against its potentially prej-
udicial impact. One of the long-standing categories of evidence that is 
generally excluded is evidence of other charged and uncharged crimes 
and bad acts.59 The so-called "propensity rule,,6o prohibits the intro-
duction of prior bad acts to prove that the defendant acted in conformity 
with his bad character. The theory is that a judge or jury will convict 
or hold the defendant liable, not on proof of the wrong charged, but 
because he has a propensity to commit similar crimes or bad acts.61 
Although rules against admission of this type of evidence are most often 
invoked by defense attorneys in criminal cases, these rules apply in 
both civil and criminal cases in most jurisdictions.62 
Evidence of prior bad acts is especially relevant and probative in 
domestic violence cases because of the cyclical nature of domestic vi-
olence. As one commentator described it: 
Domestic violence is never a single isolated incident. Rather, domestic 
violence is a pattern of behavior, with each episode connected to the 
others. Many times, as the pattern of abuse evolves, the level of serious-
ness escalates. In the most unfortunate instances, the consequence of do-
mestic violence is homicide. By allowing evidence of past specific inci-
dents of abuse in domestic violence cases, courts could help to prevent 
this escalation.63 
59. FED. R. EVID. § 404(b) states: 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identify, or absence of 
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in 
a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if 
the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
Although the evidence is commonly referred to as "prior" crimes or bad acts, the 
federal rule (and most state counterparts) include evidence of acts committed both 
before and after the incident at issue in the litigation. 
60. EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 637 (5th ed. 
1999). 
61. Other policy reasons for excluding prior bad act evidence relate primarily to 
criminal prosecutions for domestic violence and are generally focused on guaranteeing 
the presumption of innocence. For example, if evidence that a defendant committed a 
similar crime is admitted, a jury may require less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
because the defendant is not an "innocent" party or, in the case of prior uncharged 
crimes, because he needs to be punished for the prior act. 
62. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Mis-
conduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character 
Evidence Prohibition, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 575, 576 (1990). 
63. The Search for Truth, supra note 9, at 240, citing Anne L. Ganley, Understand-
ing Domestic Violence, in IMPROVING THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM'S RESPONSE TO 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A RESOURCE MANUAL FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 18 
(1995). 
HeinOnline -- 34 Fam. L.Q. 57 2000-2001
Evidence Issues in Domestic Violence Civil Cases 57 
Prior acts of abuse are often necessary to prove to the fact-finder the 
nature and seriousness of the abuse involved. One act of abuse may not 
warrant the same remedy as a case where there has been a pattern of 
abuse between the parties. Different remedies are required when there 
is an isolated act of abuse that is unlikely to be repeated as compared 
to a serious act of abuse following a pattern of abuse. The more abuse 
that occurred in the past, the increased likelihood that future acts of 
abuse will occur and thus the need for greater protective measures. 
Courts of limited jurisdiction that hear some domestic violence 
cases-protection orders and crimes classified as minor-may not 
strictly apply the rules of evidence. The traditional judicial hesitancy 
to admit prior bad act evidence, therefore, may not apply. In other cases, 
where one or both of the litigants are pro se, objections to this type of 
evidence will probably not be made. In many cases, however, where 
the rules of evidence are observed and parties are represented, practi-
tioners will need to address evidentiary challenges to prior abuse evi-
dence. There are a variety of theories upon which practitioners can rely 
in arguing for admission of pattern of abuse evidence in protection 
order or other civil proceedings where domestic violence is at issue. 
First, in some circumstances, you can argue that the general prohibition 
on admitting prior bad acts evidence does not apply because past abuse 
is an element of the cause of action. This argument would be particu-
larly persuasive when the statute relied upon instructs the court, either 
directly or indirectly, to consider a history or pattern of abuse. Many 
protection order statutes, for example, include a directive to the peti-
tioner to include the incidents of past abuse in the petition or may direct 
the court to consider a history of domestic violence before granting 
particular relief in the order. 64 
This argument was successful in Coburn v. Coburn, where the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland affirmed a trial court's admission of prior evi-
dence of abuse in a protection order proceeding.65 The court noted that 
the language in Maryland's protection order statute included both a 
directive to the petitioner to include prior acts of abuse and required 
consideration of the history of abuse before granting certain kinds of 
64. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. § 4-501(b)(ii)(requiring inclusion of prior abuse in 
petitions for protection); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634 R.634.20 (West 1996); ARIZ. REv. 
STAT. § 13-3602 (West 2000) ("The court shall issue an order of protection ... if the 
court determines that there is reasonable cause to believe ... the defendant has com-
mitted an act of domestic violence within the past year .... "); CAL F AM. CODE § 6300 
("an order may be issued to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a recur-
rence of domestic violence ... if an affidavit shows ... reasonable proof of a past act 
or acts of abuse"). 
65. 674 A.2d 951 (Md. Ct. App. 1996). 
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relief under the statute. After analyzing the protection order statute's 
references to past abuse, the court concluded that the statutory refer-
ences demonstrated the relevance of past abuse evidence in deciding 
whether and what kind of protection order should issue.66 The court 
went on to state: 
The policy consideration underlying the general prohibition against ad-
mission of evidence of prior crimes or bad acts is that such evidence tends 
to prejudice the defendant because the trier of fact will improperly use 
the evidence to determine the ultimate issue of guilt. This rationale does 
not apply in a civil protective order hearing where the ultimate issue is 
what, if any, remedy is necessary to protect the petitioner based on the 
likelihood of future abuse. Evidence of past abusive acts is admissible to 
show that abuse is likely to recur and to help the court determine what 
remedies will adequately prevent future abuse. Hence, Md. Rule 5-404(b) 
is inapplicable and evidence of prior incidents of abuse is admissible.67 
Other courts have also relied on either the implicit68 or explicit69 lan-
guage of the protection order statute to find that the court should admit 
and consider evidence of past abuse when issuing a protection order. 
In child custody and visitation cases, the courts are more willing to 
accept evidence of domestic violence as a part of the best interests 
assessment. Most custody and visitation statutes also direct the court 
to consider the parties' history of abuse,7o or require consideration of 
domestic violence as a factor in the best interest analysis.7! Almost 
every state requires courts to consider the presence of abuse when mak-
ing such determinations.72 The effect of this evidence varies among the 
states.73 Some states prohibit the award of custody to a parent who has 
66. ld. at 258-59. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has also approved 
the admission of evidence of prior abuse in protection order cases noting that "a [bat-
terer's] past conduct is ... perhaps the most important [evidence] of his probable future 
conduct. ... This is especially true in the context of a marital or similar relationship." 
Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 930 (D.C. Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted). 
67. ld. at 260. The Coburn court also offered a related justification for admitting 
to prior abuse evidence in noting that the character of the accused as an abuser is at 
issue in protection order proceedings. ld. at 260-61. Even where the statute does not 
direct the court to consider history of abuse, it can be argued character is directly at 
issue in custody and visitation cases where fitness of one or both parents is a primary 
consideration. 
68. Boniek v. Boniek, 443 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Minn. 1989) (finding that under the 
Domestic Abuse Act "past abusive behavior, although not dispositive, is a factor in 
determining cause for protection"). 
69. Strollo v. Strollo, 828 P.2d 532 (Utah 1992) (reversing a trial court decision 
denying a protection order and finding that the language of the protection order statute 
required the court to consider past abuse). 
70. See Family Violence Project, supra note 3. 
71. ld. 
72. See id. at 204. 
73. /d. 
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been found to have committed domestic violence in the past.74 Others 
have created a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody or vis-
itation to the abusive parent.75 Courts vary in the amount of evidence 
of abuse that is necessary to trigger a finding that a parent has engaged 
in domestic violence.76 Some states require a conviction for a serious 
domestic violence-related crime.77 Other states look for a pattern of 
violence. Idaho requires an "habitual perpetrator,,,7S Louisiana, Mis-
souri, and Oklahoma require that the abuse be ongoing or part of a 
pattern of conduct. 79 In most states a mere preponderance of evidence 
will suffice to prove domestic violence for the purpose of affecting the 
custodial decision. Oklahoma, however, requires that such evidence be 
"clear and convincing. "so In all of these situations, if an objection is 
made to prior bad acts evidence, the practitioner can argue that the 
legislature in your state has created a "statutory exception" to your 
Rule 404(b) counterpart. 
Responding to objections to prior abuse evidence where the court 
doesn't recognize a statutory exception is more difficult. There are, 
however, persuasive arguments to be made that evidence of prior do-
mestic violence is admissible under well-recognized exceptions to Rule 
404(b). Most rules prohibiting admission of prior bad acts to prove 
character or propensity permit the admission of such evidence when it 
is relevant to a noncharacter issue such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of a mistake, or 
accident. S1 Case law on these exceptions in the domestic violence area 
74. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 25-332 (1997); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-
10-124 (West 1997); 770 ILL. COMPo STAT. § 5/602 (West 1998); N.H. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 458:17(1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (1997); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-
112,20-2-113 (Michie 1997). 
75. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 705 (a) (1997); FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) 
(1997); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (1997); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(a) (West 1997); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17, subd. 2(d) (West 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22.3 
(1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §21.1(d) (West 1997). 
76. See, e.g., David M. Gersten, Criminal Practice; Evidentiary Trends In Domestic 
Violence Cases, 72 FLA. B. J. 65, 67 (1998) (discussing language of Louisiana, Mis-
souri, Oklahoma, Delaware, and Florida custody statutes which direct the court to 
consider past abuse). In some cases, however, the victim's ability to introduce evidence 
of past abuse is limited to certain types of evidence such as felony convictions. Id. 
77. Id. Delaware requires a felony or serious misdemeanor. See DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 13, § 705 A (1997). Florida requires a conviction for a second degree felony or 
higher to establish a rebuttable presumption what will preclude joint custody. See FLA. 
STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (1993). 
78. IDAHO CODE § 32-717(1997). 
79. See, e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 649 So. 2d 799 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Hamilton 
v. Hamilton, 886 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Brown v. Brown, 867 P.2d 477 
(Okla. 1993). 
80. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 112.2 (1997). 
81. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b), supra note 59. 
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has focused primarily on criminal prosecutions. In Clark v. United 
States,82 for example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals re-
viewed a case in which a man who had killed his paramour claimed 
that he had done so by accident. The court held that "an attempt to 
restrict the violence [between the parties] to the events of the fatal 
evening would unreasonably cramp the inquiry, to the detriment of the 
search for truth." The court recognized in this and other cases that the 
likelihood of mistake or accident diminishes when the defendant has 
engaged in a pattern of abuse against the victim. 
Probably the most widely publicized litigation involving an effort to 
introduce evidence of past abuse to show motive is the OJ. Simpson 
prosecution.83 In that case, the prosecution was successful in admitting 
some of the evidence, which included testimony, photographs, "911" 
tape-recorded phone call by the victim, as well as evidence of physical 
beatings and threats by the defendant going back several years from 
the date of the murder.84 The evidence was admitted "to provide the 
jury with an appreciation of the 'nature and quality' of the relationship 
between Mr. Simpson and Ms. Brown, and to aid in establishing motive, 
intent, plan, and identity of the killer. ,,85 In the protection order context, 
evidence of prior abuse may be relevant in proving the batterer's intent, 
motive, or absence of mistake. For example, intent is an element of 
assault, battery, and false imprisonment, all types of abuse within the 
definition of abuse in most protection order statutes.86 
Evidence of prior abuse has also been admitted to prove identity in 
criminal prosecutions. In a leading California case, People v. Zack,87 
the defendant was charged with murdering his girlfriend by beating her 
to death. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
decision to admit evidence of prior abuse against the victim to prove 
82. 593 A.2d 186 (D.C. 1991). See also State v. Featherman, 651 P.2d 868 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1982) (acknowledging the significance of understanding the pattern of abuse 
in the relationship of the defendant and victim to prove both motive and intent); People 
v. Thompson, 314 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (evidence of prior bad acts, such 
as threats to kill the victim, admissible to establish motive for assault with intent to do 
great bodily harm). 
83. No. BA 0 9 7211 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct., Oct. 3, 1995). 
84. David Margolick, Prosecutors Win Key Simpson Fight: Judge Allows Most Ma-
terial About Domestic Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1995, at B8. 
85. Lisa A. Linsky, Use of Domestic Violence History Evidence in the Criminal 
Prosecution: A Common Sense Approach, 16 PACE L. REv. 73, 74 (1995). Of course, 
in this case such evidence did not lead to conviction but in many cases it would. 
86. Klein & Orloff, supra note 2, at 848-876. 
87. 229 Cal. Rptr. 317, 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). The decision was a departure 
from prior precedent which permitted evidence of prior crimes to prove a defen-
dant's identity only where the characteristics of the prior bad acts are similar enough 
to the charged crime to raise an inference that the crime was committed by the same 
person.ld. 
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identity when the defendant contended he was out of town the night of 
the murder. 
Practitioners can also argue that evidence of prior bad acts should 
be admitted to negate anticipated defenses. Again, this theory is not 
well-developed in the civil context but there is ample precedent on the 
criminal side for allowing prosecutors to admit evidence of a defen-
dant's prior crimes in their case in chief to counter anticipated de-
fenses. 88 An increasingly common defense in protection order and cus-
tody cases where allegations of abuse are made is that the victim has 
a motive to fabricate the allegations to gain an advantage in a divorce 
or custody case.89 If you anticipate the batterer will claim that your 
client fabricated some or all of the allegations, you can argue that evi-
dence of prior abuse should be admitted to rebut this defense claim. 
Finally, at least one state, California, has adopted a rule of evidence 
which provides specifically for the admissibility of prior bad act evi-
dence to prove propensity in domestic violence cases under certain 
circumstances.90 California's new rule is based upon the recently en-
acted Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 which permit, under 
certain circumstances, the admission of uncharged acts in sexual assault 
88. See, e.g., People v. Santarelli, 401 N.E.2d 199 (N.Y. 1980) (evidence of prior 
bad acts may be admitted in anticipation of disproving defendant's anticipated abuse 
that he was legally insane at the time of the crime); Solomon v. State, 646 A.2d 1064, 
1082-83 (Md. Spec. Ct. App. 1994) (evidence of prior crimes may be admitted to 
counter anticipated defense). 
89. Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Tons and Divorce: Constraints and 
Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 366 (1997), citing Naomi R. Cahn, Civil 
Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody De-
cisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1085 (1991); see also Roberta L. Valente, Addressing 
Domestic Violence: The Role of the Family Law Practitioner, 29 FAM. L.Q. 187, 191 
(1995). 
90. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109 (a) (1997) provides: 
[I]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving 
domestic violence, evidence of the defendant's commission of other domestic vi-
olence is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, ifthe evidence is not inadmissible 
pursuant to Section 352. 
(b) In an action in which evidence is to be offered under this section, the people 
shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, including statements of witnesses or a 
summary of the substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered, at least 
30 days before the scheduled date of trial or at a later time as the court may allow 
for good cause. 
(c) This section shall not be construed to limit or preclude the admission or 
consideration of evidence under any other section of this code statute or case law. 
(d) As used in this section, "domestic violence" has the meaning set forth in 
section 6211 of the Family Code meaning set forth in Section 13700 of the Penal 
Code. 
(e) Evidence of acts occurring more than 10 years before the charged offense is 
inadmissible under this section, unless the court determines that the admission of 
this evidence is in the interest of justice. 
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and child molestation cases to show propensity and disposition.91 These 
"groundbreaking" rules were enacted because of congressional "out-
rage that the Federal Rules of Evidence were being used to keep the 
jurors from finding out about the extremely probative evidence of un-
charged rapes unless the attacks were extremely similar in the facts. ,,92 
While California's rule only applies to criminal prosecutions for do-
mestic violence, practitioners may use it to argue for similar treatment 
in civil cases in their jurisdictions. The new California rule may also 
be reflective of a trend in which legislators and judges recognize the 
distinctive nature of domestic violence cases and the need for modi-
fying evidentiary rules to address these cases.93 
v. Conclusion 
As states pass more laws enhancing the remedies available to victims 
of domestic violence and recognizing its devastating effects on chil-
dren, the historical informality of these proceedings is likely to fade 
replaced by more adherence to traditional rules of evidence. We have 
identified three types of evidence that pose the greatest challenges for 
practitioners. This article outlines strategies for victims and their ad-
vocates (1) to use expert opinion to enhance the understanding of the 
effects of battering; (2) to benefit from the evidence generated due to 
a concurrent criminal action while blunting efforts of alleged perpetra-
tors to manipulate that system; and (3) to make effective use of the 
batterers' prior acts of abuse in meeting evidentiary thresholds. The use 
of the evidentiary strategies can substantially increase a lawyer's 
effectiveness in protecting victims of domestic violence and their 
children. 
91. For opposing views on FED. R. EVID. 413-414, compare Bridging the Gap, 
supra note 9, with James L. McCandless, Prior Bad Acts and Two Bad Rules: The 
Fundamental Unfairness of Federal Rules of Evidence, 413 and 414, 5 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 689 (1997). 
92. See, e.g., Bridging the Gap, supra note 9, at 381. 
93. Proposals to follow California's lead and adopt rules admitting prior abuse 
evidence in domestic violence cases are being developed in other states as well. See, 
e.g., The Search for Truth, supra note 9 (describing a proposal for an evidentiary rule 
for Hawaii which would broadly admit prior abuse evidence in domestic violence 
cases). 
